NISM Professor

Delivery default penalty

Also written Delivery default norms · Penalty for delivery default

The SEBI-prescribed charge on a seller who fails to deliver against an expiring contract — a fixed percentage of the settlement price plus a replacement cost, most of which is paid over to the buyer.

In plain language

A futures contract is only worth what it can be enforced for. If a short who cannot find the goods could simply pay the price difference, the buyer who genuinely needed the commodity would be left to scramble in the spot market at whatever it costs him.

So SEBI sets a penalty with two jobs. The fixed percentage is the deterrent — it hurts enough to make default a last resort. The replacement cost is the compensation — it measures what the buyer actually lost by having to source the goods elsewhere afterwards, and it is handed to him.

Since May 2021 a defaulting buyer can be penalised too, which was not the case before.

How it works

The fixed slice and the way replacement cost is measured both differ by commodity type:

Agricultural futuresNon-agricultural futures
Fixed penalty4% of settlement price3% of settlement price
Replacement cost benchmarkAverage of the three highest of the last spot prices of the 5 succeeding days after the commodity pay-out dateThe higher of the last spot prices on the commodity pay-out date and the following day
If that benchmark is not above the settlement priceReplacement cost is zeroReplacement cost is zero

The apportionment is fixed regardless of which column applies:

  • At least 1.75% of settlement price into the clearing corporation's Settlement Guarantee Fund
  • Up to 0.25% retained by the clearing corporation for administration expenses
  • The balance — 2% for agri, 1% for non-agri — plus the whole replacement cost to the buyer who was entitled to receive delivery

Clearing corporations and exchanges may raise or lower the penalty for specific commodities in consultation with SEBI, and may run additional deterrent or disciplinary mechanisms against intentional or wilful default.

For a defaulting buyer, introduced with effect from May 2021 under the circular of 23 March 2021, there is no fixed percentage. The clearing corporation reviews the loss the non-defaulting seller incurred at its sole discretion and levies a penalty, capped at the delivery margins it had collected from that buyer.

The formula

Seller penalty (agri)     = 4% x Settlement Price + Replacement cost
Seller penalty (non-agri) = 3% x Settlement Price + Replacement cost

Replacement cost = max(Benchmark spot price - Settlement Price, 0)

A worked example

An agricultural contract. RM seed, lot 10 MT = 100 quintals, Final Settlement Price Rs 5,500 per quintal, contract value Rs 5,50,000. The short fails to deliver.

Over the five days after the commodity pay-out date, spot prices print 5,620 / 5,680 / 5,710 / 5,730 / 5,590. The three highest are 5,680, 5,710 and 5,730:

Benchmark        = (5,680 + 5,710 + 5,730) / 3     = Rs 5,706.67 per quintal
Replacement cost = (5,706.67 - 5,500) x 100        = Rs 20,667
Fixed penalty    = 4% x 5,50,000                   = Rs 22,000
Total payable by the defaulting seller             = Rs 42,667

And the split:

DestinationBasisAmount
Settlement Guarantee Fund1.75% of Rs 5,50,000Rs 9,625
Clearing corporation, administrationup to 0.25%Rs 1,375
Buyer entitled to delivery2% (Rs 11,000) + replacement cost (Rs 20,667)Rs 31,667
Rs 42,667

Had this been a non-agricultural contract of the same value, the fixed slice would have been 3% — Rs 16,500 — of which the buyer keeps 1%, or Rs 5,500, and the SGF and the clearing corporation take the same Rs 9,625 and Rs 1,375.

Notice that the SGF and administration shares are identical in both cases. The whole of the agri-versus-non-agri difference goes to the buyer.

Why NISM asks about it

Chapter 7 (Clearing, Settlement and Risk Management), section 7.6, with the Due Date Rate link in Chapter 6 section 6.2.4. This is a heavily examined table: expect "penalty on a seller defaulting on an agri futures contract" (4% plus replacement cost), the 1.75% SGF share, and the definition of replacement cost — which differs between agri and non-agri.

Common exam traps

  • 4% is agri, 3% is non-agri. The higher penalty attaches to the perishable, harder-to-replace commodity.
  • Replacement cost is floored at zero. If spot after pay-out is at or below the settlement price, the buyer lost nothing to replace and receives only the fixed share.
  • The two replacement-cost benchmarks are different. Agri uses the average of the three highest of five succeeding days; non-agri uses the higher of two days. Swapping them is the standard error.
  • 1.75% and 0.25% are the same for both commodity types. Only the buyer's residual moves.
  • The buyer-default penalty has no fixed rate and is capped at the delivery margins already collected from that buyer — it is discretionary, not formulaic.
  • Settlement price here means the Final Settlement Price or Due Date Rate, not the last traded price.

Check yourself

  1. 1.In a commodity futures contract, what is the position of the buyer and the seller at expiry?

    1. a)The buyer has an obligation to buy and the seller has an obligation to sell
    2. b)The buyer has a right but not an obligation; the seller has an obligation
    3. c)Both buyer and seller have a right but not an obligation
    4. d)The seller has a right but not an obligation; the buyer has an obligation
    Show the answer

    Answer: (a) The buyer has an obligation to buy and the seller has an obligation to sell

    A futures contract is a legally binding agreement between the buyer and the seller, in which the buyer enters into an obligation to buy, and the seller is obliged to sell, on the specific date.

    Both sides are bound. This is the single feature that separates a future from an option — and it is why a futures buyer can lose money, which an option buyer never can.

    Option (b) describes a call option from the buyer's side; option (d) describes a put option. The exam frequently mixes these three products in one question, so anchor on the word obligation.

    One consequence worth carrying forward: because the seller's obligation is real, an open short position at expiry must actually be delivered — from spot purchase or existing stock — or a delivery default penalty falls due.

  2. 2.Regarding physical delivery, which statement is correct?

    1. a)Only a fraction of futures contracts leads to actual physical delivery, while forwards generally result in actual physical delivery
    2. b)All futures contracts result in physical delivery, while forwards are usually cash settled
    3. c)Both futures and forwards almost always result in physical delivery
    4. d)Neither futures nor forwards can result in physical delivery
    Show the answer

    Answer: (a) Only a fraction of futures contracts leads to actual physical delivery, while forwards generally result in actual physical delivery

    Only a fraction of futures contracts leads to actual physical delivery of commodities, whereas forward contracts generally result in actual physical delivery unless specified otherwise.

    The reason is liquidity, not intention. Because futures are standardised and anonymous, a participant can simply square off by taking the opposite position at any time — as the workbook's gold trader does, buying in April at Rs 50,000 per 10 gm and closing in May at Rs 55,000 without ever seeing the metal. A forward has no such exit; you would have to go back to the same counterparty and renegotiate.

    But do not read "only a fraction" as "never". An open short position in futures on expiry needs to be delivered by buying from the spot market or from one's existing stock, meeting the contract's quantity and quality specifications — and failing to do so means a delivery default penalty.

  3. 3.Which risk refers to the cost of substituting an original trade with a new trade, as the new trade may be done at a different and probably adverse price to the aggrieved party?

    1. a)Rollover risk
    2. b)Principal risk
    3. c)Replacement-cost risk
    4. d)Systemic risk
    Show the answer

    Answer: (c) Replacement-cost risk

    (This is a sample question from the NISM workbook.)

    "REPLACEMENT-COST RISK refers to THE COST ASSOCIATED WITH REPLACING THE ORIGINAL TRADE, as the new trade MAY GENERALLY BE DONE AT A PRICE DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINAL PRICES AND PROBABLY AT AN ADVERSE PRICE TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY."

    It is also called pre-settlement risk, and it is one of the two components of counterparty risk:

    ComponentWhen it bites
    ⚠️ Replacement-cost (pre-settlement)Before settlement — the trade fails and must be redone at a worse price
    ⚠️ Principal⚠️ During settlement"arises when the buyer/seller HAS NOT RECEIVED THE GOODS/FUNDS BUT HAS FULFILLED HIS OBLIGATION"

    Option (b) principal risk is therefore the near-miss — and it is the one the market has genuinely solved: "ELIMINATED BY HAVING A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY such as clearing corporation and through the principle of NOVATION." Replacement-cost risk cannot be eliminated the same way; it is instead compensated, through the replacement cost component of the delivery default penalty.

    Option (d) systemic risk is broader — "the default by one of the parties LEADS TO THE DEFAULT OF OTHER PARTIES TOO... THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT."

Where this is taught

Free preparation for NISM Series XVI

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